Monday, October 30, 2023

For Next Class

Monday audio. Please confer with opposing counsel and co-judge before class next Monday. Once I have roles, I also will distribute information about the arguments, including dress code.

We will begin with some final words on Mootness. Why might the state-court origins of Pap's A.M. have affected the Court's choice on mootness? What is the problem with, as Pfander suggests, courts considering the merits of a case (or class of cases) in deciding how strictly to apply justiciability? Why might a Court do that? Consider two examples: SCOTUS held in Poe v. Ullman (1961) that a pre-enforcement challenge to Connecticut's was not ripe; in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Court declared the law invalid. SCOTUS held in Hollingsworth v. Perry (2012) that intervening defendants lacked standing to appeal a trial court judgment declaring California's prohibition on same-sex marriage invalid; it held in Obergefell (2015) that prohibitions on SSM violate the 14th Amendment.

We turn to Abstention--General Principles and Statutory Abstention. What is abstention? What is "mandatory jurisdiction?" What are the separation of powers arguments for and against these doctrines? What is Congress' role as to abstention? Does statutory abstention raise the same separation of powers concerns? What is comity as a policy concern for federal courts?

On Statutory Abstention:

    • What is the purpose of § 2283--who benefits from limiting federal courts and how? What is the purpose of the tax injunction acts (§ 1341 and § 7421) and why not allow claims to enjoin taxes?

    • What are the exceptions to § 2283 and why? What is the difference between "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" and "to protect or effectuate" judgments?

    • Why is § 1983 an expressly authorized exception? Why is the Clayton Act not in Vendo?

    • What is the relitigation exception and how does it fit into § 2283? How does preclusion fit into the statute? How can preclusion be raised as an issue?

    • Consider the procedural posture of Atlantic Coastline. How did § 2283 apply and what should the Union do?

        • Railroad sues Union in federal court in 1967, seeking to enjoin pickets at the Moncrief Terminal. The federal court denies the injunction.

        • Railroad sues Union in state court in 1967, seeking to enjoin pickets at Moncrief Terminal on state-law grounds. The state court grants the injunction.

        • SCOTUS in Jacksonville Terminal (1969) held that unions enjoy a statutory right to picket on employer property and that the union could picket at Jacksonville Terminal.

        • Following Jacksonville, Union moves the state court to dissolve the injunction, under authority of Jacksonville. The state court refuses.

        • Union sues Railroad in federal court, asking the federal court to enjoin the Railroad from seeking to enforce the state-court injunction.