Tuesday audio--Part I, Part II. Court of Appeals papers due Monday.
We will finish District Courts with Complete Preemption, including the Rodriguez Notice of Removal.
Then move to the next panel, prepping Ex parte Younge and Three-Judge Courts.
The Love Child of Con Law and Civ Pro
Monday audio. Double session on Tuesday--9:30-10:45 in RDB 2008, then regular time in regular room. Court of Appeals papers due next Monday, October 6.
Finish everything for District Courts (ignore the questions about § 1350). This will take us through both sessions Tuesday and probably a bit next Monday. Ignore the questions marked "Three Judge" and "Declaratory Judgments;" that is for the next section. Looking at § 1338(a), what is the rule for exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in federal district courts?
Consider: An independent contractor brings a Title VII action against a business that has fewer than 15 employees. Title VII only prohibits discrimination against employees, not independent contractors; Title VII only prohibits "employers" from discriminating, defined as an entity with 15 or more employees.
What is the basis on which this action fails?
In Trump v. Slaughter, on whether the president can fire FTC commissioners without cause. The Court stayed the injunction (allowing the firing to take effect immediately) and granted cert before judgment to reconsider Humphrey's Executor and whether district courts can hear federal officers' challenges to removal from office.
According to Steve Vladeck, this is the 23d grant of cert before judgment since February 2019; prior to that, the Court had not taken a case this way in more than 15 years.
Monday audio. No class tomorrow. First make-up at 9:30 a.m. next Tuesday, September 30 in RDB 2007, followed by our regular class.
We will hit a few final words on Courts of Appeals, namely the process for mandamus. How is it consistent with Marbury? Who litigates on behalf of the sued court/judge?
An interesting-but-rare side issue to our discussion of § 1292(b): The District of Delaware held that that where a case is transferred to a new judge, the new judge cannot certify the old judge's order. This creates some obvious problems for appealability? Worth considering whether the court gets the text right and what the textual solution might be.
We then move to District Courts, covering Structure, Jurisdictional Overview, Removal, and Removal of Exclusive Jurisdiction. Note there are a bunch of provisions, some of which are on the blog; please have them in class. Add to the statutory mix § 2000e-2 (Title VII). Also read Chemerinsky pp. 273-84 and 287-88 and Pfander pp. 133-44--be ready to talk about the meaning and purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
This Ninth Circuit case involves bankruptcy courts and appeals to district courts, which we will discuss in a few weeks. But it involves appeals and timing and illustrates what we discussed last week: A party must understand when an order is final even if if does not plan to immediately appeal, because it may have no choice--a final order must be appealed
The bankruptcy court (the lowest court) entered an order (vacating a stay) that is understood as final (through a doctrine functionally equivalent to the COD). The adversely affected party did not appeal it at the time, continuing to litigate other issues. The later attempt to appeal was untimely.
Tuesday audio. We do not have class on Tuesday. I expect/hope to finish Courts of Appeals on Monday; if not it may carry to the following Monday (9/29). anel 4 (District Courts) should be ready to go for the beginning of class on Monday, 9/29.
Prep and review Interlocutory Orders. How can SCOTUS grant mandamus, given Marbury?
Monday audio. Panel # 2 papers due tomorrow. Constitution Week panels tomorrow and Wednesday; both at 12:30 in RDB 1000. We will look for some make-up times for 9:30, TBD.
Continue with Finality. Can you explain how COD has broken out, along the lines of the three elements of Cohen? Consider:
X, the defendant in a criminal prosecution, challenges (as a Fifth Amendment violation) a court policy of keeping pre-trial detainees in five-point shackles during non-jury court proceedings, regardless of whether the detainee poses a security threat; the court holds that the shackling is permissible. Can X appeal under COD? How should we understand the decision for purposes of the third prong of Cohen?
Move to Interlocutory Review, including all the assigned statutes. How do all the various mechanisms fit together as a whole?
Battle of the Branches, featuring interviews and discussions with faculty members at University of Chicago. The first, second, and final episodes are most relevant to this class.
1) No make-up next Monday (September 15). About half the class has a conflict, so it makes no sense to hold the session. Normal class both days next week. Make-ups TBD.
2) During our shadow-docket discussion, I forgot to mention the connection between the increase in stay petitions to SCOTUS and the increase in cert before judgment--the Court responds to a petition for a stay pending review to the court of appeals by treating it as (and granting) a petition for cert before judgment and taking up the entire case. See, for example, United States v. Texas. This also came up in Trump v. Boyle. The Court granted a stay in a firing case, based on a prior order in a firing case; Justice Kavanaugh concurred to argue the Court should have granted cert before judgment. Note that Kavanaugh's concurrence in CASA requires additional cert-before-judgment, because he insists that the Court must resolve the "interim" merits earlier in cases.
3) Shane asked for examples of the Court making a stay decision, then coming out the other way. The most prominent example of the Court staying the injunction but then affirming is Allen v. Milligan (a redistricting case from Alabama, on mandatory review of a 3-judge district court). Two examples of the Court refusing to stay the injunction but eventually reversing on the merits--Biden v. Texas and US v. Texas.
4) Point # 3 somewhat relates to another piece of the shadow docket controversy--whether the Court should write something to explain its stay decisions. In Labrador v. Poe and in CASA, Justice Kavanaugh wrote concurrences to justify not writing--the concern that writing "locks" the Court into a position on the merits.
5) The Court granted the latest cert before judgment today, in the tariffs case (actually two consolidated cases). This involves consolidation of cases at different stages--plaintiffs sought cert before judgment in one case while the government sought cert from a Federal Circuit decision in the other.
Tuesday audio. SCOTUS Papers due at beginning of class next Tuesday. Double session on Monday, so we should get through all of Finality and COD; we will take a break and return at 12:30.
Additional questions: Why have the Federal Circuit and does it make sense as a specialty court? Review the rules and statutes governing the process for appeal and what parties must do. How does a party appeal prior non-final orders once a judgment is final?
One is The Substance and Procedure of Birthright Citizenship, a discussion of CASA and the citizenship E.O., featuring Prof. Roman and me, sponsored by the College of Law and several student groups.
12:30 p.m. next Tuesday, September 9 in RDB 1000 (Large Courtroom).
Monday audio. Panel # 3 should be ready to go, but just prep Structure; we won't get beyond that.
We will finish State Court Review, then move to Review of Federal Courts (including these materials). We will begin with the other two possibilities in Cox and how they implicate federal policy concerns. Then review the pages in Moore; consider why Category # 2 is wrong and whether # 4 would have been a better fit.
We hopefully will get to Courts of Appeals: Structure towards the end of class.
We will discuss the "shadow docket" (Chemerinsky pp. 673-74) as part of SCOTUS's review of federal courts. This is an increasingly controversial subject, especially in the first months of the current administration.
In addition to that reading, look at NIH v. APHA, especially Justice Gorsuch's concurring opinion, and pp. 23-31 (especially FN 9) of Harvard v. HHS.
Two more things. First, read this NBC New story based on interviews with ten lower-court judges. Beyond what this tells us about the emergency docket, consider the problems or benefits of rhetoric such as Justice Gorsuch uses and the response from Judge Burroughs and those interviewed for the NBC story. How does the nature of the emergency docket create tension among the courts and with the executive and public?
Second, this NY Times story (H/T: Sara) on a district judge "apologizing" for failing to treat an emergency order as binding precedent. I put apologizing in danger quotation marks because it is not clear he was apologizing as much as explaining why he approached the cases as he did. Read this in connection with Harvard FN 9, which reflects a different response to Justice Gorsuch.
Prof. Steve Vladeck (One First) discusses the Administration's plan to send Texas National Guard troops (unfederalized, so under the command of the Texas government) to Chicago and the potential statutory and constitutional problems with this plan. He also discusses how Illinois might challenge this in court, including by suing Texas in an original jurisdiction action in SCOTUS or by suing the Secretary of Defense in district court. Consider that there should be two automatic votes (Thomas and Alito) to allow the action.
Although he does not discuss it, there is a third option--sue the U.S. in SCOTUS on original jurisdiction. The case arguably raises some of the sovereignty and speed concerns that justified original jurisdiction in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
Prep the rest of Review of State Courts and then Review of Federal Courts of Appeals. Review the Vladeck piece, which provides a nice history of cert before judgment. What does it mean for a case to be "in" the court of appeals for § 1254 purposes.
Read pp. 8-11 in Moore v. Harper. The Court reject the independent state legislature doctrine--the theory that the U.S. Constitution grants state legislatures exclusive and unilateral control over redistricing and selector of presidential elections, unchecked by the state executive or state courts. The case was complicated because the North Carolina Supreme Court first reached the merits and rejected ISL, then (while the case was pending in SCOTUS and after the court's political alignment changed) reconsidered and held that political gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under the state constitution. SCOTUS thus had to consider whether the initial judgment rejecting ISL was final for § 1257. Was the Court right in finding finality? Did it rely on the correct Cox category?
I hope to begin Panel III by sometime Tuesday.