Tuesday audio. Double session on Tuesday as advance make-up for the Tuesday before Thanksgiving.
We will continue with the current panel for § 2283 and the tax
injunction acts (§§ 1341 and 7421); be sure to review § 2201 and § 1983.
What does "expressly authorized" mean in § 2283? Why does § 1983 constitute an
exception and why does § 16 of the Clayton Act (in Vendo) not?
What is the purpose of the tax injunction acts? How does a person challenge a constitutionally invalid state or federal tax? What constitutes a tax subject to the statutes? What if a party seeks a declaratory judgment that a tax is invalid, rather than an injunction?
We will move to the next panel and the judge-made abstention doctrines (Colorado, Burford, and international comity). What are the elements of each of these? What are the similarities between Colorado River and international comity abstention? What factors and principles do courts balance as to each?
What should happen in the following case:
A, a US citizen, sues X, a Japanese citizen, in federal court on an antitrust claim; the court enters judgment for A and awards $ 10 million dollars.
X sues A in a Japanese court under Japan's "clawback" statute, which allows a Japanese citizen to recover under Japanese law the amount owed on a federal antitrust judgment.
A asks the federal court to enjoin X from proceeding with the Japanese action. Can it issue the injunction?
Finally, Pullman and Younger abstentions are the most frequently litigated judge-made abstention doctrines. But they arise exclusively in constitutional cases, so for space reasons I move them into Civil Rights next semester. I want to spend a few minutes reviewing each, so you have a basic idea of what is going on. So read the (short) Pfander sections on Pullman (pp. 363-69) and Younger (pp. 371-81).
